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The Indonesian Massacre of 1965 
and Reconciliation Efforts in Contemporary Indonesia 
 
by Dr. Ni Wayan Pasek Ariati  
 
Introduction 
Indonesia declared its independence in August 17, 1945 after more than three centuries of 
colonization by the Dutch, and a short period of Japanese occupation (1942-1945), with 
Soekarno as the first president and Mohammad Hatta as his vice president. However, as an 
independent country, Indonesia encountered many problems economically, socially and 
politically. Under the Soekarno regime known as the Old Order, there were two powers; the 
Armed Forces (ABRI) and the Communist Party (PKI), both vying for the attention of Soeharto 
and intent on influencing his economic and political policies. The PKI was the largest communist 
party outside Russia and China at that time, and as such was perceived as a threat to American 
security in Asia. Soekarno’s ideology, known as Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion and 
Communism), was designed to embrace the interests of the nationalists, religious organizations 
and laypersons and the Communist Party; however, the idea of combining three widely divergent 
ideologies triggered endless conflicts that pitted the military and religious right against the 
Communist Part. This conflict came to a head on September 30, 1965, when six generals and a 
lieutenant were killed in a bungled attempt at abductions destined to head off a coup against 
Soekarno. Major General Soeharto stepped in at this point, seeing a golden opportunity to pin the 
blame for the murder of the generals on the Communist Party, and their supposed allies, the 
Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerwani), who were falsely accused of mutilating the generals 
in a wild orgy that ended with their murder.  
 
In time Indonesia’s first president was forced to hand over power to Soeharto; during the same 
period a genocidal campaign was unleashed that brought death to somewhere between 300,000 
and a million Indonesians identified as “communist sympathizers”.  While former President 
Abdurachman Wahid initiated a process of rehabilitation of survivors of the genocide of 1965, to 
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this day Indonesia has yet to work out a program of reconciliation that takes account of the needs 
of both the victims and perpetrators. This paper is aimed at addressing this issue.   
 
Brief historical background on the Indonesian Genocide  
By 1965 the government of the Orde Lama, or “Old Order” of President Soekarno had reached a 
point of crisis. Following internal rebellions in central Sumatra and Sulawesi of the mid-1950s, 
Soekarno had disbanded Parliament and established what he termed a Demokrasi Terpimpin, or 
Guided Democracy (1959-1965), which was unpopular with many elements of the armed forces 
and civil society. His famous ideology of Nasakom (Nasionalism, Agama, Komunis or 
“Nationalism, Religion and Communism”) had created further tension by attempting to bring 
together the dominant religion (Islam) and the doctrine of communism, which was generally 
believed to be atheist in its essential formulation. This led to deep suspicions that Soekarno was 
attempting to bring an end to religious aspects of Indonesian society by first forcing an alliance 
with the left, then turning on a weakened religious majority and bringing its power to an end. 
Soekarno’s isolationist policy in international affairs had further deepened the crisis by bringing 
Indonesia to the brink of financial collapse. His speech of August 1965, titled Tahun Vivere 
Periculosa, “the Year of Living Dangerously” must have been read by many as a sign that he 
was prepared to act on his left-leaning principles and align himself with the Communist Party to 
bring an end to all opposition to his rule, especially from the Army and religious majority of the 
civilian population.  
 
There were also particular factors that led to the emergence of a very unstable political situation 
in August-September 1965.  One of the main factors was the health of Soekarno who collapsed 
during his working day on 5 August 1965. His condition was diagnosed by a team of doctors 
from the Republic of China (RRT, Republic Rakyat Tjina) who had been called in by the 
Communist Party chief D.N. Aidit. Their conclusion was that Soekarno would either die or be 
paralyzed for the rest of his life (Nugroho Notosusanto and Saleh, 1967:7, The Centre for 
Information Analysis, 1999:4, McGregor, 2007:3). This brought up the important matter of the 
succession to the presidency after Soekarno passed away. There were two candidates most often 
mentioned as possible successors to Soekarno: General A. Yani and General A.H. Nasution, both 
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major generals of the Army. Soekarno preferred General A. Yani, who was serving at the time as 
his Minister for Defence and Security and Chief of Staff of the armed forces, rather than General 
Nasution.  
 
Another significant factor that may have helped to trigger the chaotic events of 1965 was an 
emerging confrontation between the Communist Party (PKI) and right-wing forces among the 
armed forces, especially in the Army. Right-wing elements in the Army were strongly supported 
by conservative religious groups like NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), which were strongly anti-
communist. While the PKI (Communist Party) had allies and sympathizers among the officer 
corps of the Army they did not want a candidate for the succession to be drawn from the Army 
since they had had a long and bitter history of rivalry, marked in recent memory by the massacre 
of PKI forces led by Muso at Madiun in 1948 by right-wing elements of the Army - this at the 
very time when both sides were fighting against the Dutch colonial forces during the revolution 
that eventually led to the independence of Indonesia in 1949.1  
 
Tensions between the Army and the PKI were also high due to the perception of many officers 
that communist ideology was incompatible with the Pancasila, the ideological foundation of the 
Indonesian state first promulgated by Soekarno and his allies in June 1945. In common 
Indonesian perspective, the PKI was a party of atheists and so in direct contrast with the first of 
the five principles of the Pancasila, which clearly stated that the Indonesian state should be 
founded on “Belief in One God” (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa). However, despite significant 
opposition to its materialist principles, the PKI was fortunate to have gained the protection of 
President Soekarno, largely because he considered the PKI as his chief ally in providing a 
counter-balance to the power of the Army and the right-wing religious groups (Notosusanto and 
Saleh, 1967:4).  
 
From early on during his presidency, the PKI had shown their support for Soekarno and had been 
enthusiastic supporters of his efforts to balance the growing power of the Army (Cribb, 
1992:349). In return, the PKI gained much freedom to operate in Java, sometimes directly 
                                                          
1 For a recent review of the Madiun Affair of 1948 see McGregor (2007:49-50). 
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establishing left-wing organizations, at other times bringing affiliated organizations into their 
circle of influence. The growing power of the PKI might well have been considered a threat by 
the Army, especially when talk circulated about establishing a fifth force recruited from 
peasants, fishermen and other members of youth organizations in addition to the four military 
forces known as ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) that already existed: the Air 
Force (Angkatan Udara), Navy (Angkatan Laut), Army (Angkatan Darat) and Police (Angkatan 
Kepolisian).  
 
By mid 1965, a rumour was spreading among the military and the political parties that a Council 
of Generals (Dewan Jenderal) backed by the CIA had been formed and that they would attempt a 
coup aimed at bringing down Soekarno and removing him from the presidency, which was 
considered by more conservative members of the Armed Forces to be leaning too much to the 
left in favour of the PKI (The Selected Document around the G.30.S compiled by Dinuth, 
1997:20,158). The rumour spread that the coup attempt planned by the Council of Generals 
would be carried out on the 20th anniversary of Armed Force Day on 5 October 1965. In reaction 
to the “coup” rumour, the Presidential Guard of Soekarno and several left-wing parties and other 
loyal organizations established the Council of Revolution (Dewan Revolusi) chaired by 
Lieutenant Colonel Untung bin Syamsuri (Anderson and McVey, 1971:124-25; the Centre for 
Information Analysis, 1999:6, Crouch, 1978:97).2 The Untung group was supported by the 
Seventh (Diponegoro) Military Territorial Division based in Semarang (Anderson and McVey, 
1971:1) under the command of Brigadier General Surjosumpeno and also by a group of officers 
from the Air Force under the command of Air Marshal Omar Dhani based at Halim 
Perdanakusumah airfield in Jakarta (Notosusanto and Saleh, 1967: appendix D).  
 
The “Abortive Coup” of 30 September—1 October1965  
                                                          
2 It is important to note here that the members of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council were 
from various components of the government and civil society, which included a number of 
political parties and religious groups. Organizations with large male and female memberships 
were represented as well as organizations with a wide variety of ethnic groups among their 
members, including Chinese (Anderson and McVey, 1971:127-29, Dinuth, 1997:48-49 in the 
document “Decision No. 1 concerning the composition of the Indonesian Revolution Council”). 
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According to accounts by the New Order regime of Suharto, there were many personnel from a 
number of military divisions who were key actors in the events of 30 September 1965; some 
were important as initiators of the coup attempt and some were simply peons who were set in 
motion to carry out the kidnappings. What we do know is that on the night of Thursday Kliwon 
30 September 1965 a group of conspirators led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, military 
commander of the Tjakrabirawa division or Presidential Guard, attempted to kidnap seven 
generals who were believed to constitute the Council of Generals - Lieutenant General A. Yani, 
Major General Soeprapto, Major General S. Parman, Brigadier General Soetojo Siswomiharjo, 
Brigadier General D.I. Pandjaitan, Major General Harjono, and General Abdul Haris Nasution3. 
General Nasution was able to escape from the raid by climbing over the wall of the Iraqi 
Embassy next to his house. However, his five-year-old daughter, Ade Irma Suryani Nasution, 
was shot and died in the hospital a few days later.  
 
If we talk about the events of 30 September 1965, the first figure that is usually connected to the 
events is Lieutenant Colonel Untung Sutopo bin Syamsuri (Lt. Col. Untung), the military 
commander of the Tjakrabirawa division or Presidential Guard (Hughes, 1967:18, Wieringa, 
2002:283). It is often stated in official versions of events that D.N. Aidit, the leader of the 
Communist Party, was also directly connected to the events, but more realistic accounts show 
that he had to be awakened when his aides brought him news of the events and this throws doubt 
on the possibility of his direct involvement. The presence of Untung at Lubang Buaya during the 
night of the coup has long been held to strengthen the suspicion of his involvement with the coup 
group.  
 
In carrying out the “abortive coup”, a group of conspirators headed by Colonel Untung divided 
their responsibilities. The Pasopati division commanded by Doel Arief, First Lieutenant of the 
Infantry, had the responsibility of kidnapping the generals; the Bima Sakti division under the 
leadership of Infantry Captain Suradi was given the task of taking over the control room of Radio 
Republik Indonesia (RRI) and other telecommunications systems and the Ghatotkaca division 
                                                          
3
 Kliwon is one of the days of the five-day Javanese “market week” that is noted for its special “powers” when it 
coincides with Thursday of the seven-day week. It seems likely that this day was chosen specifically for the 
abductions due to its connotations of being powerful.  
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under Air Major Gatot Sukresno had the responsibility to coordinate activities at the Lubang 
Buaya training ground and to recruit and train the volunteers who would provide back-up for the 
insurrection (Hughes, 1967:27, Notosusanto and Saleh, 1967:246, The Selected Document 
around G.30.S/PKI compiled by Dinuth, 1997:28).  
 
The Pasopati division commanded by First Infantry Lieutenant Doel Arief had the responsibility 
to kidnap the seven generals of the presumed “Council of Generals” (Hughes, 1967:27). In the 
original planning surrounding the kidnapping of the generals, there was no command or plot to 
kill them. According to the plan, they were to be kidnapped and taken to the presidential palace 
to be asked about the truth or falsity of the rumour that had been circulating about the formation 
of a Council of Generals whose aim was to remove Soekarno from office. But what happened in 
the implementation of the command in the field differed a great deal from the plan. What 
actually ensued was a series of chaotic events that to some minds suggest an intentional effort to 
create chaos and abort the original plan. For example, the command is said to have been that the 
generals should be arrested “alive” but the plot was changed into “alive or dead” due to 
unexpected events during the abduction. General A. Yani for example, did not obey the 
summons of the raiding party to go to the presidential palace in a peaceful manner, but resisted, 
and was thus shot on the spot (the Centre for Information Analysis, 1999:40).   
 
Omar Dhani, the Air Vice Marshal of the Air Force, is also assumed to have been involved in the 
events of 30 September 1965 due to his role in making use of the Lubang Buaya area of the Air 
Force base at Halim Perdanakusumah airfield as a training base for volunteers from the Pemuda 
Rakyat (Indonesian Youth), Gerwani and other mass organizations in preparing for the “crush 
Malaysia” (Ganyang Malaysia) campaign of Soekarno.4  These volunteers were to support the 
formation of a “fifth force” composed of peasants and Pemuda Rakyat volunteers, who would be 
                                                          
4 The“Ganyang Malaysia” campaign was the Indonesian project to crush Malaysia, which in the 
Soekarnoist view has been used by British to establish a new colonial base during the 1960s. 
Soekarno had long set his agenda as opposition to what he termed “Nekolim”, the “Forces of 
Neo-colonialism and Imperialism” and had chosen the fledgling state of Malaysia as a target in 
this struggle. This led to a series of military misadventures along the Malay-Indonesian border 
in northern Kalimantan (Borneo) that did nothing positive on the military front and may have 
increased the opposition of the officer corps to his presidency.  
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trained to use firearms and follow military discipline in order to develop a counterforce to the 
official armed forces (Anderson and McVey, 1971:67; The Centre for Information Analysis, 
1999:46, Wieringa, 2002:283). The main piece of evidence used at the trial of Omar Dhani to 
show that he was involved in the so-called “Movement of 30 September” was that his name 
appeared on the list of the Council of Revolution as mentioned in their “Decision No. 1 
concerning the composition of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council” (Anderson and McVey, 
1971:124 and Dinuth, 1997:48). However, in actual fact Omar Dhani’s role in the events of mid-
1965 was more general, as a facilitator for training of militant volunteers in the Lubang Buaya 
area and as the mentor for the so-called the fifth force in instructing them in military discipline 
and the use of firearms. It was this “fifth force” in training at the Lubang Buaya field that 
became the main target of government propaganda following the abortive counter-coup of 
September 30 and October 1, 1965.5 
 
Aftermath of the Abortive Coup  
While some scholars have spoken of a “spontaneous outbreak of violence” following the events 
of September-October 1965 there was a time lag of several months before the actual start of the 
massacres that took between 300,000 and a million lives. One important development during this 
period was the creation of the “myth of Gerwani”. In this version of the aborted coup (or 
counter-coup) attempt the story began to circulate that the “women of Gerwani” had mutilated 
the generals in a wild orgy with men of the PKI that ended with the murder of the generals. 
Evidence for the spread of these stories can be found in the archives of the KITLV in Leiden, 
where copies of issues of journals of the Armed Forces like Berita Yudha (9 October 1965) and 
Harian Angkatan Bersendjata (11 October 1965) spoke, for example, of the story of “Jamilah”, a 
                                                          
5 The fifth force volunteers who were trained at Lubang Buaya beginning on 5 July 1965 were 
under the command of Major Udara Suyono and assisted by Gatot Sukrisno and Major Udara 
Sukarto Kartono. Potential members of the fifth force were recruited from mass organizations 
all over Indonesia especially from Java, and included mass organizations like BTI (Barisan Tani 
Indonesia), PR (Pemuda Rakyat), Jamiatul Muslimin, Universitas Res Publika SOBSI (Sentral 
Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), and Gerwani (Dinuth, 1997:15). Each party selected its 
best members to be sent to Jakarta to participate in the training based in the Lubang Buaya 
area. During the lead up to the events of 30 September 1965 a group of volunteers from the 
“fifth force” in training at Lubang Buaya was chosen to be among the conspirators who were to 
capture the seven generals. 
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17-year old widow who was described as having sexual intercourse with one of the generals 
before they were murdered. The name given to the group of conspirators in these publications 
represents another aspect of the myth-making or black propaganda that was to have terrifying 
results for many innocent Indonesians. The words Gerakan Tiga Puluh September (“Movement 
of 30 September”) were used to form the acronym Gestapu that intentionally made people think 
of the terror of Nazi Germany; this was combined with constant reinforcement of the idea that 
the PKI was planning to eradicate religion in Indonesia and thus prepare young men with strong 
religious principles to think of participating in the mass arrests and ‘elimination’ of ‘Communist 
sympathizers’ that began in January 1966.   
 
I won’t detail the history of the actual genocide here, except to repeat that the figure on direct 
casualties ranges between 300,000 and a million people. I want to focus instead on the long-term 
effects on the Indonesian people. Indonesia was changed forever during the last few months of 
1965. Major General Soeharto, who went on to rule as President until 1998, took action 
immediately in the days following the coup, isolating then-President Soekarno, and forming a 
new branch of the military called Kopkamtib, the “Committee for the Restoration of Law and 
Order”. In addition to organizing the detention centers and mass arrests that laid the basis for the 
genocide of 1966-67, Kopkamtib designed and implemented a system of registration and 
surveillance of all Indonesians whose original aim was to identify all ‘Communists’ and 
‘Communist sympathizers’, and following this to ensure that anyone from among these groups 
who survived the secret, nighttime massacres that often followed upon arrest and detention, or 
deportation to the prison camp on Buru Island, would be marked forever in their Identity Card 
(KTP, Kartu Tanda Penduduk) as having been implicated in the events of September 1965. This 
system also penalized those who were merely related to victims of the genocide, or survivors of 
imprisonment, who were listed in their official registration papers with the local government 
with the designation tidak bersih lingkungan (“not clean in environment”). This made it almost 
impossible for them to enter the Civil Service, or gain admission to a state university. Beyond 
this, a system of controls on movement was set in motion that included the need to obtain a Surat 
Tanda Kelakuan Baik (“Letter Certifying Good Behavior”) in support of any major move of 
location for work or study, and upon arrival in a new area of residence, the need to obtain a Surat 
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Tanda Melaporkan Diri (“Letter of Having Reported Oneself”). Each of these documents 
contained a line requiring the applicant to state where they had been on the night of 30 
September 1965, and whether they or any member of their family had ever had any connection 
with the PKI or its affiliates. In addition to providing a quasi-legal basis for the imprisonment 
and summary execution of an enormous number of Indonesians, the work of Kopkamtib thus 
was able to establish a bureaucracy of control that was described as intended to “prevent the 
rebirth of the Communist party” but in actual fact was a constant reminder of the monopoly of 
the state on terror.  
 
The account of one of the Gerwani Leaders in Bali  
Ibu Pasek, whose real name is Ni Ketut Pasek Kariasih, born in 1932 in Denpasar, Bali, informed 
me that Gerwani was a very interesting women’s organization whose members were devoted to 
social causes, and not at all the terrifying organization devoted to the ‘spread of Communism’ 
that was claimed by the architects of the New Order (Orde Baru) regime of former President 
Soeharto. According to Ibu Pasek the programs offered by Gerwani were very attractive not only 
for women but also for men, especially poor farmers from the rural areas of Bali.6 As the deputy 
director of Gerwani in Bali, Ibu Pasek was very active in implementing programs designed by 
Gerwani for establishing schools for children around her area in Denpasar. Being born in the city 
she had never worked in the rice-fields, and so became very enthusiastic when Gerwani planned 
to help poor farmers working in the rice fields in the Karangasem area of East Bali. She says that 
she tried very hard to put her feet in the shoes of the farmers. As she describes her experiences 
working in the rice-fields, she managed to follow along with the work of the men and women of 
the farming community she joined, but nearly fainted at one point from not having anything to 
drink while working under the hot sun in the mud and water of the fields.7  
                                                          
6 Men who were attracted by the more militant approach of left-wing organizations towards the 
question of land reform usually joined the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) or “Indonesian Farmers 
Front”, without necessarily adopting a leftist ideology, or even understanding its broader 
implications.  
 
7 Knowing that Bu Pasek enjoyed visiting farming areas, I took her to my village in a rural area 
where she could recall her fond memories while visiting with the farmers and other villagers in 
the rice-field areas. She and her second husband, Pak Jendra, were very happy when they were 
gazing at the lush greenness of the rice-fields (personal communication, April-May 2008).  
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In 1963 when Mount Agung, the highest mountain in Bali, erupted, Ibu Pasek and other Gerwani 
members went to the affected areas to distribute aid in the form of food, clothing and materials 
for temporary shelter. She and the other Gerwani members could only reach the affected area by 
means of helicopter because there were no passable roads connecting the affected areas with 
Denpasar, where the relief effort was being coordinated.  Moreover, since there were no suitable 
landing sites they had to drop the food supplies and other items from the helicopter. The food 
that was prepared in the Denpasar area was divided into small packages to facilitate carrying and 
distribution. Ibu Pasek glowed with happiness when she talked about her experiences in helping 
under-privileged people. But her happiness as one of the leaders of Gerwani suddenly ended in 
tragedy when Gerwani was violently suppressed in the months following the killing of six 
popular generals and a lieutenant during the “abortive coup” of 30 September 1965, known in 
Indonesia mainly by its acronyms G.30.S/PKI or Gestapu (Gerakan 30 September/Partai 
Komunis Indonesia). During the months following these events, Ibu Pasek was among the many 
Indonesians who were arrested and confined to detention centers without due process of law. Ibu 
Pasek survived her imprisonment, but she endured severe torture when people interrogated her 
about her involvement in the Gerwani organization (personal communication, 2007- 2008). 
 
The events of September 1965 marked a turning point for the women’s movement of Indonesia, 
which was brought to a sudden and violent halt prompted by black propaganda spread by the 
New Order, the new political regime initiated by Major General Suharto during the two years 
following the events of 1965. After first reviewing briefly the account of one of the perpetrators 
of the mass killings of 1966-67 other Gerwani members who were labelled as affiliated with the 
Communist Party after the events of September 1965.  
 
The Reconciliation Efforts 
There are a few efforts for reconciliation and rehabilitation being carried out by the non-
government organizations both in Java and Bali. The Indonesian government especially during 
the New Order under the Soeharto regime established governmental organizations like 
Kopkamtib, the Committee for the Restoration of Law and Oder that gave the impression of 
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being legally constituted branches of the government, but were in fact created through 
Presidential Directive, without the deliberations or ratification of the legislative and judicial 
branches of government, so at best arguably legal in the constitutional sense. This allowed 
Kopkamtib, and its successor Bakorstanas (Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas 
Nasional, “Board for the Coordination of Assistance in Establishing National Stability”, 
established in 1988) to effectively control all discussion of the suppression of the political left 
and the Indonesian women’s movement until Bakorstanas was finally closed in the year 2000. 
Following the “Era of Reformation” that began with the fall of the New Order in 1988 a new 
sense of the ability to speak freely could be felt immediately in Indonesia. Discussion groups 
addressing all manner of social and historical problems are now commonplace on liberal college 
campuses in Indonesia, and creative writing about the tragedy of 1965-67 and its long-term 
effects can be published without fear of political repercussions.8 However, continuing 
government concern about open discussion of the founding myths of the New Order Regime of 
former President Soeharto (1967-1998) are still evident in actions like the recent banning of the 
Indonesian translation of an important historical study of the events of 1965 by the historian John 
Roosa (2006). 
 
While there are local organizations that bring together survivors of the quasi-legal detentions of 
1965-68, very few of these have a mandate to promote efforts for reconciliation. I believe this is 
largely because their focus is to work together as friends to overcome the stigma attached to 
them and their families because of lingering suspicion around their ‘involvement’ in the events 
of September-October 1965. 
 
However, there are a number of organizations that are playing an active role in reconciliation 
efforts. One of these is the a non-governmental organisations based in Yogyakarta known as 
                                                          
8 The Balinese writer Putu Arya Tirtawirya produced several short stories dealing with the 
terror of 1966-67 as early as 1979 (see the bibliography of this paper for details). Apparently 
since Tirtawirya lived in Lombok, far from the center of literary activity in Jakarta, his works 
escaped the notice of Kopkamtib and the government board of censors. More recent works on 
themes related to the events of 1965-67 or its long-term consequences include short stories 
like “Kalanaga” by Triyatno Triwikramo (2009) and “Kami Membongkar Rumah” by Imam 
Muhtarom (2010).  
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Syarikat Indonesia, the acronym for Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat Indonesia 
(Advocacy for the Indonesian People by the Society of Students of the Muslim Faith). Perhaps 
due to its strong roots in the practice of Islamic piety that has become a major force in 
Indonesian society in the last several decades, this organization has been able to effectively 
advocate for both the civil and political rights of those who were accused of being communists or 
communist sympathizers in the past. Syarikat Indonesia was founded in 1993 by the youth of 
Nahadlatul Ulama (NU), the conservative Islamic organization that remains the primary 
organization representing the communities that espouse the traditional, syncretic form of 
Javanese Islam. Members of this organization played a significant role in the mass killings of 
1965-67, largely due to having been convinced through skilful use of the media—and the 
powerful rumor mill that has a more direct influence on opinion making in rural Indonesia—that 
the PKI had been on the verge of a campaign to wipe out Islam in Indonesia when its plans were 
‘disrupted’ by Major General Soeharto’s intervention in the events of September-October 1965., 
The main purpose of the Syarikat Indonesia is to create a more peaceful and democratic 
Indonesia through an reconciliation and rehabilitation of civil and political rights of the victims 
of the mass detentions and secret massacres of 1965-68.  
 
The tragedy of 1965 was the most traumatic event in the history of modern Indonesia history 
because it happened not in a single place, but all throughout the archipelago, and with special 
ferocity in Java and Bali, the major centers of the Indonesian population. That tragic event 
directly caused many deaths of innocent people without due process of law, both for those who 
were known to be directly involved in the Communist Party, and the many people who belonged 
to social organizations that were branded as “sympathetic” to Communism.  The mass-killings 
that happened mainly in Java and Bali were nearly always carried out in the middle of the night, 
with the victims who had already been detained and were defenceless.  
 
The survivors of the ordeal of detention were also treated unjustly during the New Order regime. 
Operating under the ‘regulations’ of Kopkamtib people who had been detained were stigmatized 
by having their Identity Cards (KTP, Kartu Tanda Penduduk) marked in the upper right-hand 
corner with the letters ET, meaning “ex-Tapol” or “ex-political detainee”.  Indonesians who held 
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these special ID card could never get any position as civil servants, attend a state university or 
find work in any government-related sector of the economy. Through the designation “unclean 
environment” Kopkamtib also made certain that an equal stigma was applied to extended family 
members of “ex-Tapol”, including children who knew nothing about the political climate or 
events of the 1960s. In order to counteract these long-term negative effects of the tragedy of 
1965 the Syarikat Indonesia seeks to advocate for the political and civil rights of the victims of 
illegal detention through their several  reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts.  
 
The Syarikat Indonesia’s charter calls for the carrying out of reconciliation and rehabilitation 
efforts as follows:  
 
1. Investigation 
In this stage, Syarikat carries out investigations in certain areas in Java to compile case 
histories from survivors of the detentions of 1965-68 with the expectation that the 
information gained from these investigations will assist the Syarikat to make sure the 
community around the investigation gains a more realistic perspective on the lives of the 
victims, and thus to change their perception toward the victims. For the victims 
themselves, Syarikat provides a forum to express their feelings of oppression and 
marginalization  caused by discrimination from the community where they live. 
 
2. Mediation 
In this effort, the Syarikat has approached key persons to be the mediators for both the 
victims and community members in the places they live. In the Islamic areas, it is still 
very hard to approach people for reconciliation due to the perception created in the past 
that the all Communists were atheists who are still determined to eradicate religion and 
establish a secular state. It has been the Syarikat’s goal to convince religiously inclined 
communities that this is not the case, and to make them aware that the survivors are not 
trying to create civil unrest but only want to be treated fairly. Since the members of the 
Syarikat are devout Muslims, it is easy for them to approach Islamic religious leaders, 
termed kyai in Java, and ask them to be mediators and peace-makers between the victims 
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of the repression of 1965-68 and the community members. This effort has been 
successfully implemented in many areas of Central Java by the Syarikat. 
 
3. Seminars 
The Syarikat also hold public seminars with participants drawn both from the public at 
large and from victims and perpetrators in the repression of 1965-68. The Syarikat invites 
key speakers who can accommodate differing opinions, solutions, and seek the best way 
forward for reconciliation and rehabilitation. The key speakers also try to gain as much 
insight as possible from the stories told by participants and statements of the victims of 
oppression expressing their desire to be fully accepted by their communities. However, 
these seminars are not always success due to the continuing stigma attached to what the 
Indonesian state continues to refer to as the “latent danger of the banned Communist 
Party (PKI)”.   
  
4. Public campaigns  
The purpose of public campaigns conducted by the Syarikat is to gain support from the 
public to advocate for the civil and political rights of the victims of the repression of 
1965-68. The Syarikat has found that effective means for these efforts include public 
outreach via mass-media such as the development of websites, publishing articles, books 
and magazines as well as appearing in talk-shows on television.  
 
5. Lobbying 
Lobbying efforts of the Syarikat are conducted in order to seek direct influence among 
important authority figures who are involved in creating policy in the legislative and 
executive branches of the government, with the special aim of encouraging the drafting of 
a “bill of rights” for victims of the illegal detentions and repression of 1965-68. There are 
two activities of the Syarikat that fall into this category: proactively approaching 
members of the regional and national legislative bodies (DPRD and DPR), and by 
participating in informal meeting with representatives of the major political parties, and 
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other important government officials who can be asked to support the idea of 
reconciliation and rehabilitation for the victims of repression and illegal detention.  
 
6. Drafting of legislative documents 
The Syarikat is currently seeking to assist in the drafting of laws to protect ex-political 
detainees by developing a team of experts who work with representatives of the 
legislative branch of the national government to draft laws and regulations that will 
advocate for the civil and political rights of the victims of repression based on the 
evaluations and perceived needs drawn from the investigations and mediations of the 
Syarikat and the history of Syarikat discussions of past policies and their effects on ex-
political detainees.   
 
All those efforts of reconciliation and rehabilitation carried out by the Syarikat have met with 
success, despite the continuing presence of minor obstacles in some parts of rural Java.  In Bali, 
another organization, known as the YPKP, or Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965-66 
(“Foundation for Investigation into the Lives of Victims of the Mass Killings of 1965-66”) has 
begun to make inroads into the difficult task of ensuring that Balinese victims of the detentions 
and repression of the early New Order period can be rehabilitated in their communities. In Bali 
the victims of the repression of the mid-1960s are less fortunate, in large part due to the strong 
religious belief in karma, the belief that any action will produce good or bad consequences. The 
problem of circularity arises here in that the bad things that happened to community members 
who have, rightly or wrongly, been associated with the Communist party, are seen as a direct 
reflection of their own ‘sins’ of the past. This creates an environment for efforts at reconciliation 
and rehabilitation that is more challenging for organizations working to advocate for the rights of 
victims in Bali. However, the YPKP has been able to make progress in their work and we can 
hope that the growing number of educated young Balinese will begin to understand that complex 
social and political issues need to be viewed from varying perspectives, and not from the point of 
view of a single, religious conviction.  
 
Conclusion 
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From talking to a number of survivors of the repression of 1965-68 in Java and Bali I have drawn 
the crude conclusion that the most important means for progress in the treatment of the survivors 
will be made if and when the Indonesian government makes a decision to apologize officially to 
the victims of the mass-killings of 1965-66, in order that they can be accepted in the community 
where they live. The national government continues to play an enormous role in opinion-making, 
so their positive intervention in the processes of reconciliation and rehabilitation would be the 
most effective way of bringing about a healthy change in the perspective of local communities 
and individuals. The tragic events of September-October 1965 are still shrouded in mystery, so 
another positive step forward can be taken by ensuring that the next generation is truly about 
their true history, not a history that has been orchestrated by the powers that be in order to justify 
the basis of their control over the Indonesian people. While the work of NGOs has been, and is, 
making a significant contribution to the rehabilitation of ex-political detainees in some areas, the 
larger effort to achieve reconciliation and rehabilitation will not be affective without government 
involvement in support for increasing the awareness of Indonesian people of the need for peace 
and unity for all Indonesians.    
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